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To what extent and in what ways does the European Union (EU) seek to adjust the global public policy debate to its own goals and priorities? Our paper sheds light to these crucial questions regarding the EU’s global role by examining the Union’s relationship to the World Trade Organization (WTO), adopting and revising public procurement regulations as the case study under investigation.




The relationship between the European Union (EU) and international organizations (IOs) is increasingly subject to scholarly attention. There are good reasons for that. The EU has over time enhanced its international presence and seeks to increase its influence over political and economic arrangements at global level.  It remains an open question what exactly the political direction of this influence is, and whether the EU always acts as in unity whilst seeking to influence IOs. Meanwhile, the multiplicity of IOs and their continuing ability to operate in quasi-legal terms offers both opportunities and constraints to the Union’s international profile. 

In that context then, and focusing on global economic governance the relationship between the EU and the World Trade Organization (WTO) is especially important, given the increasing salience of economic issues in world politics. The formation of the WTO in 1995 ushered a new era of enhanced liberalization in international trade, and the organization’s emergence went parallel with the declared intention by the world’s major economic powers, the EU among them, to push for deeper liberalization as a means of promoting prosperity and higher levels of economic growth. Interestingly, the EU is a non state member of the WTO which allows it to play a key role in the negotiations, of similar importance to the US.  The EU has been a key actor advocating public procurement liberalization and regulation, and the Government Procurement Agreement (GPA) agreed in tandem with the WTO’s formation bears testimony to that. Moreover, the Union has been central to the subsequent revision of that agreement in 2012 and the attempt to transfer EU practices in the globally lucrative market of public procurement. 

This paper takes its cue from the recent revision of the GPA mentioned above and places this at the heart of its analysis regarding the relationship between the EU and the WTO.  It compares the revision of the GPA with the modernisation of the EU directives on public procurement that started in 2011 and was concluded in 2014. Seeking to derive wider lessons regarding the EU’s global economic presence and its ability or not to operate through IOs for the purpose of fulfilling its political and economic objectives, this paper asks whether, why and how the EU has sought to transfer its public procurement practices to the global level, who were the key actors behind this policy development and what the implications of such a stance are regarding the EU’s role in the global economic architecture. Theoretically, we demonstrate that the concept of transnational regulatory networks can potentially overcome important limitations of the (more frequently used) principal agent (PA) approach in explaining EU policies.  By applying the transnational regulatory networks approach we also aim to further advance it by highlighting first, the importance of the informal nature of networks and second, the impact that the participation of EU and IO officials has in the accountability of the networks. Empirically, the paper demonstrates the cyclical nature of the relationship between the EU and the WTO in adopting and revising the Union’s public procurement Directives as well as the WTO’s Global Procurement Agreement (GPA). With the Commission playing a central role in framing the contours of the EU policy debate and representing the EU member-states in the revision of the GPA, the paper also highlights the enhanced role of the European Parliament (EP) in reforming the EU policy agenda on procurement policy.  





The EU as a Global Economic Actor 

The European Union has long been seen as an ascending power in international politics, with an increasing degree of political and economic influence (Galtung 1973; Moravcsik 2002; Reid, 2004). Politically, the Union has in the recent past seemed to fail to live up to such expectations, often appearing disunited in the face of external challenges and facing severe criticism of its alleged weakness at the international level (see Kagan 2003). With regards to its economic might, however, the literature points to a much rosier picture. Because of its peculiar nature as more than a classical intergovernmentalist organization and less than a federal entity, the Union is praised for having a decisive say in global economic trends. For some this takes the form of traditional, interest-based calculations in a world where self-interest provides the ultimate guide to policy behaviour – and the EU is no exception to this rule (Hyde Price, 2006; Zimmermann 2007). Yet for others the EU has a strong normative dimension (Manners 2002; 2006; Leonard, 2005) that promotes soft policy instruments, such as trade, to enhance its overall standing. This, it is claimed, sets it apart from its competitors and enhances its attractiveness, not least to the many countries that seek to join its ranks.

Looking into EU trade policy as a sub-set of its economic actorness, Elström (2007, 954) neatly summarizes the sources of EU economic power into four distinct categories. First is the sheer material power of the EU stemming from its prominent position in the global division of trade share. As the world’s largest trading bloc the EU has now acquired the capacity to rival the ability of the United States to set its own rules to other states or blocs of states to follow. The best example in this regard is the extent to which the EU grants other states permission to access its vast internal market and thus be able to compete for a share of the world’s largest internal market (Bretherton and Vogel, 1999; Meunier and Nicolaidis, 2006). Without having to act in an explicitly demanding manner towards others, the Union can thus use its structural power to obtain concessions from others, including WTO members, in accordance with its own economic policy agenda (ibid., p.908). Occasionally, and this is the second relevant category here, the EU does not hesitate to make a direct link between its economic clout and explicit policies that it wants other states to adopt. This is a tactic used in regional trade agreements and in such instances where the Union seeks to obtain particular concessions from the entity it negotiates with (Elström, 2007: 955). It has also been EU practice in recent years in the WTO context as well, as the Union has challenged ‘protectionist’ policies by its main economic rival/partner, the United States, as well as countries such as India, Korea, Japan and Australia (Schaffer, 2006: 837).

Thirdly, the EU can inspire others, particularly in its periphery, to imitate its approach and take EU arrangements as a model for their own institutional setup. Inspiration is not the only mechanism here; others may wish to approximate laws and regulations to EU standards as they ‘shop around’ in search for best practices (Schimmelfennig 2010; Boerzel and Risse, 2012). Again negotiated trade arrangements with other regional blocs can be used as examples (Maur 2005). Finally, a large part of the literature discusses the economic clout of the EU in multilateral or bilateral trade negotiations from the starting point of the Union’s institutional setup. Thus, Meunier, applying a principal agent framework, argues (2000) that the restricted room for manoeuvre the agent (Commission) often has resulting from a mandate negotiated with all of the member states paradoxically strengthens the agent’s negotiating power in that others know how difficult it is for her to offer any meaningful concessions. This is not to say that member states are always happy to delegate power and influence; in fact, the conclusion of the GATT Uruguay Round sled to conflict between the Commission and the Council precisely on the question of competence (Billiet, 2006: 902). However, member states tend to recognize that enhanced efficiency in a globalized world trumps more nation-centric demands on trade policy (Meunier and Nicoalidis, 2006: 909). 

In order to better analyse the EU’s public procurement policy, within the EU and in the WTO, we turn to the transnational regulatory networks literature.  Most of the literature exploring the relationship between the EU and the WTO has been applying a Principal Agent (PA) approach (e.g. Meunier, 2000, Tallberg, 2002 etc).  The PA approach derives from microeconomic theory and has shed light on the processes and challenges of delegation of power to the European Commission (EC) from the member states in order to represent them and negotiate on their behalf at the WTO.  Nevertheless, its contribution to the exploration of agenda-setting and policy formulation at the EU and WTO level is rather limited.  It concentrates more on whether the European Commission is acting more independently than planned rather than on the way policies and initiatives are prioritised at the EU level and then transferred to the WTO negotiations via the Commission.  The role of the European Parliament, which had been strengthened since the Lisbon treaty, is totally neglected.  The key problem with the PA approach is that although it acknowledges the existence of multiple principals (e.g. member states, lobby organisations, European and national interest groups) it does not manage to disentangle the complex dynamic relationships between all these different principals and to analyse the coalitions and networks that emerge (e.g. Kerremans, 2011).  Some fair attempts have been made but still the focus of the analysis remains the autonomy of the Commission (Elsig, 2007).  In this article it is argued that during the agenda-setting and policy formulation the Commission can play a similar role to the rest of the principals and thus an analysis of the transnational networks that are formed will allow us to better understand the hidden dynamics and subsequently the role of the EU in international organisations.   
       
A variety of approaches such as epistemic communities, advocacy coalitions and policy networks have been developed in order to describe and to analyse the way networks influence policy change.  At the transnational and global levels Stone (2013) distinguishes between Transnational Advocacy Networks (TANs) which are networks of global civil society sharing common beliefs, Global Public Policy Networks (GPPNs) which refer to global programmes and global public private partnerships, Transnational Executive Networks (TENs) which are governmental networks and Knowledge Networks (KNETS) which is a different name for epistemic communities.  As Stone notes global and transnational networks don’t necessarily contribute to a global civil society as liberals and pluralists often suggest.  They can also be seen as new constellations of privatised power aiming to influence the policies of national governments and international organisations.    All these networks described by Stone have a concrete structure and can be rather easily observed. 

We aim to advance this research agenda by shedding light to the structure of informal networks such as the ones that promoted the modernization of the EU public procurement directives and the Government Procurement Agreement (GPA). To this end we can make use of what has been described as transnational regulatory networks at the EU context (Eberlein and Grande, 2005).  We argue that the membership of informal transnational regulatory networks is broader than that of formal regulatory networks described by Verdier (2009) since it is not only national regulators participating in them but also EU officials and other stakeholders. Informal transnational regulatory networks are mainly composed by experts, representatives of national regulatory bodies, EU officials and economic actors.  They often promote regulatory convergence in economic areas such as electricity markets where no much formal Europeanization processes exist.  The focus up to now has mainly been on the way these informal networks softly harmonise national regulatory activities.  We argue that these informal networks have the capacity to also harmonise international regulation such as the EU and WTO procurement regulation.  The problem with this is that the more international and informal they become, the less accountable they are.  Interestingly, the main resource of transnational regulatory networks is information and not money or law.  Thus, the Commission plays an important role in this type of networks but it needs to keep an open policy-making style in order to keep collecting necessary information from the various stakeholders.  After the Lisbon Treaty the Commission often finds itself between member-states will and the scrutiny of the European Parliament making a principal-agent approach less relevant for the explanation of policy choices and their transfer at the international level.

The next section focuses on the interaction between the EU and the WTO during the modernization of the EU procurement directives and the revision of the WTO’s GPA.  An informal transnational regulatory network is revealed and its input in the cyclical relationship between the EU and the WTO is discussed.  It is shown that the informality of the network is beneficial for the exchange of information and for the transfer of regulations between the two organisations but at the same time accountability questions emerge.  It is explored whether the informality of the network allows for the asymmetrical input of private interests in the discussions.  Using a qualitative research methodology and relying on documents analysis and on more than 15 interviews with EU, WTO and interest groups conducted in Brussels and Istanbul, the paper sheds new light to the dynamics behind procurement policy in the EU and the WTO and the role of the EU as a global actor.   

EU Directives on Procurement: origins and revision

In our attempt to understand the relationship between the EU and the WTO we analyse the relationship between the procurement regulatory frameworks of the two organisations (i.e. the EU procurement Directives and the GPA). The case study of procurement is particularly important, not least because it is relatively understudied from a public policy/ international political economy perspective. Moreover, public procurement is a lucrative market for the EU, as well as an important contributor to EU GDP. It represented roughly 17% of EU-27 GDP as of 2014 and grew from 13% seven years earlier.  

In light of the above, we ask to what extent the EU has adjusted its policy agenda to the emergence of the WTO and the signing of the GPA in particular. Moreover, what role has the EU played in influencing the political priorities of the GPA, and how has its own legislative work been influenced by the equivalent process at WTO level?

Public procurement legislation has its origins in the Rome Treaty and the prohibition of barriers to trade as well as the establishment of freedom of movement and service provision. Successive Directives related to public works and supplies (as well as concessions) have been passed since, with every new piece of legislation aiming at a greater degree of legal harmonization and, since the 1990s, the simplification of existing legislative procedures.

The first relevant Directives came in 1966 (66/683) and 1970 respectively (70/32) according to which no discrimination between national and foreign products would be allowed in public procurement and public supply contracts (Bovis 2007). In 1977 Directive 77/62 added more details in Community legislation by requesting the specification of ‘objective criteria’ in tendering and award procedures as well as the prohibition of discrimination over technical specifications. Nevertheless, procurement remained subject to non-transparent practices, and the Single Market programme identified the diverse rules surrounding member states’ procurement policies as a significant non-technical barrier to trade. Thus, Directive 89/440 amended previous public works Directives and widened its scope of application to also cover concessions and state-subsidized works. Moreover, through Directive 89/665, contracting authorities were obliged to certify that their procedures adhered to procurement law and that their decisions would be subject to effective judicial review by national authorities (Bovis 2007). Finally, Directive 93/37 sought to make the legal framework less heterogeneous and included detailed references to due process regarding the award of concession contracts (Council Directive 93/37, 1993). 

Given the need to update and harmonize procurement legislation, the EU moved to a significant revision in the early 2000s. In 2004, the EU adopted three Directives on procurement in water, transport, energy and postal services; another on public works, supply and service contracts and a third on concessions. Focusing on public works, the Directive most closely linked to the GPA, reveals that the Directive’s aims were very similar to equivalent work undertaken at the WTO: increase value for money, enhance transparency in the awarding of public contracts and potentially contribute to socio-economic advancement. Moreover, the Directive was influenced by the political context of the time and in particular the Treaty-specified objectives of social and environmental sustainability (Beuter 2005). After a decade and in a process that is chronologically parallel to the adoption of the GPA, the EU revised these Directives and set up a new platform on public procurement in the Union. According to the Commission, the motivating factors behind the revision were ‘economic, social and political developments and current budgetary constraints’ (European Commission, 2014. Accessed in: http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/publicprocurement/docs/modernising_rules/reform/fact-sheets/fact-sheet-01-overview_en.pdf (​http:​/​​/​ec.europa.eu​/​internal_market​/​publicprocurement​/​docs​/​modernising_rules​/​reform​/​fact-sheets​/​fact-sheet-01-overview_en.pdf​) ). In the same fact sheet, the Commission stresses that emphasis is now paid on the environmental, social and life-cycle assessment of public procurement, while e-procurement has been reinforced. Importantly, the Commission stresses that public services at member state level are not affected by these changes. Given the controversial character of the 2004 Public Services Directive (Crespy 2013), this phrase is meant to reassure opponents of liberalization and privatization of public services regarding the Union’s socio-economic model. The new Directives have now been adopted and member states will have a grace period of two years to implement them. The Commission published in December 2011 its proposals for legislation to replace the existent Directives on procurement. Extensive amendments introduced by the EP and Council led to a compromise text in July 2013. The process came to an end in February 2014, after the Council adopted the new procurement Directives following the EP’s approval one month earlier.














The context of the GPA signing and its Revision 

The global procurement market is valued at $1.7 trillion, while government procurement accounts for between 15-20% of GDP for developing and developed countries (WTO 2014). Attempts to open up public procurement to liberalization and limit protectionism have been ongoing for decades. First attempts were made during the Tokyo Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations in the 1970s, and led to the first GPA agreement in 1979 (Reich, 2009: 991-92). The major limitation of such agreements, however, was their limited scope, since they only applied to goods procurement and only covered central government entities. In 1987 the ‘GPA79’ as amended and led to an incremental expansion of the agreement’s applicability to leasing contracts, while simultaneously lowering the value threshold of coverage (ibid., p.992). 

The formation of the WTO also led to the signing of the Marrakesh Agreement on Government Procurement (GPA), aiming at liberalizing procurement markets worldwide. The Agreement entered into force in 1996, and negotiations began swiftly thereafter for its revision. Following a protracted period of renegotiations and ratification by acceding parties, the revised GPA entered into force in April 2014 which is the same time that the EU directives on modernizing public procurement were adopted. The GPA is a plurilateral agreement and consists of 15 parties and 43 WTO members. All EU member states are parties to the GPA; and the EU counts as one party.  In practice, the European Commission negotiates as a representative of the member-states who although present in the room, avoid intervening.  In terms of its content, the GPA aims to open up competition on government procurement as much as possible. It relies on core principles, such as transparency in procurement policy, good governance and non-discrimination (Anderson, 2006; WTO Briefing Note 2013). These principles are designed to enhance competition for contracts, stimulate an improved value-for-money setup for public contracts and avoid a protectionist logic, not least in times of economic crisis.

The signing of the original GPA in 1994 legalized and formalized GATT procedures, allowing for a more efficient dispute settlement process (Billet, 2006: 901). A new environment on trade policy emerged, and the EU soon had to abandon its former stance on trade policies. Its former defensive stance, concentrating on attempts to react against discrimination by other parties, now had to be replaced by a more assertive stance. This was particularly important, given the active stance of the US in the WTO and the US government’s cooperation with business and trade associations to bring up cases against EU interests in the new organization (Schaffer, 2006: 835). Already in 1996, the EU announced a ‘Market Access İnitiative’ aiming at opening up foreign markets to EU business, a move that contrasted sharply with the former stance of the Union (ibid., p.835). The changed approach was not limited to such initiatives but entailed internal administrative changes as well. In 1998, the EU set up a Dispute Settlement Unit inside DG Trade in response to the enhanced role that dispute settlement would play in WTO procedures. Further, the same DG set up a Market Access Unit upon the initiative of Leon Brittan: barriers to trade for EU firms would now be firmly identified as part of the unit’s mandate, and cooperation between the EU and private business organizations would now assume a more structural character (Schaffer, 2006: 838). 


EU Directives Revision and the role of a transnational regulatory network 

The revision of the Directives was orchestrated by a few key actors which could be described as an informal transnational regulatory network.  Namely, the European Commission and especially DG Trade and DG Internal Markets and Services, the European Parliament, Business Europe, the Confederation of European Trade Unions (ETUC) and businesses and lobby organisations from the construction, energy and rail sectors.  A more limited but still decisive role was played by local authorities, SMEs and NGOs. Principal among them is the Commission, not least because it has the formal right to initiate the process under the Treaties.  More specifically, the initiative was taken in 2011 by the DG Internal Markets and Services aiming to revise two Directives (2004/17/EC on procurement in the water, energy, transport and postal services sectors and 2004/18/EC on public works, supply and service contracts) and to introduce a new directive on concession contracts. The new directives were adopted in 2014 and the Member States have until April 2016 to transpose them into their national law (except the e-procurement clause, where the deadline is September 2018) (DG Growth, accessed 9/2/15),

The European Parliament has made good use of its new powers under the Lisbon Treaty, and has played an important role in helping to shape the revised Directives. Following the formalization of its powers on trade policy, the European Parliament showed its teeth in 2012 by rejecting the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA) (Van den Putte et al., 2014).  Similarly, in the case of the new procurement directives, reflecting the political mood and the sceptical attitude towards liberalization (Interview 9, Interview 4), the EP was instrumental in emphasizing the need to pay more emphasis on issues such as sustainability, life-cycle cost to deter firms from bidding based solely on cheapest cost, and environmental and labour standards. Although it appears that the Council was originally sceptical in inserting strong social clauses (Interview 1); the EP was successful in pushing through changes it deemed necessary. Concretely, in the EP’s Internal Market and Consumer Protection Committee (IMCO), some MEPs played a crucial role. The EP rapporteur on the issue, the Belgian Socialist Marc Tarabella, represented the ‘social camp’ in the debate arguing for the need to streamline the legislation with social objectives such as employment creation and sustainability (Interview 7).  Heide Ruehle from the Group of the Greens/ European Free Alliance played an important role in excluding water and the rescue services from the scope of the new procurement directives (Interview 2).  Moreover, the Conservative MEP Malcolm Harbour initiated the ideas that eventually made it to the new Directives on an ‘Innovation Partnerships Procedure’, whereby a dialogue between companies and public sector bodies is set up leading to the procurement of an innovative service or product (Interview 7). 

While the role of the EP shines through our research on bringing about the revised Directives, ETUC also played an important role during the consultation process and worked closely with the EP on the social aspects of the directives’ modernization (Interview 9).  An important role is also attributed to major stakeholders such as local authorities and private enterprises. Both local authorities and SMEs play an important role in procurement at member state level but their capacity to fully understand and apply the relevant legislation is limited (Interview 9). Their involvement in the network sought to allay fears of complicated changes and streamline procedures as well as cut some of the red tape identified in the 2004 Directives. NGOs and trade unions were also involved, although their participation hinged on support by MEPs in adding their voice to proposed changes regarding environmental and labour standards (Interview 8; Interview 2).

The Commission’s cooperation with private firms goes back to the late 1990s, and industrial firms were particularly active in the revision of the Directives. Nevertheless, there is no homogenous business stance on the issue, nor do all industrial associations adopt the same attitude to public procurement rules. Whilst it is clear that many Business Europe members reacted negatively to changes concerning social and environmental standards, interpreting them as added and unnecessary red tape to what already existed before others saw the issue differently.  All in all Business Europe engaged fully in the consultation process for the modernization of the public procurement directives despite its initial hesitation in order to get the most out of it for its members (Interview 8; Interview 10).  Large enterprises involved in large projects on infrastructure, construction or telephone services tended to see the new legislation favourably, as it would allow them to compete in more favourable terms with smaller firms who would only rely on cost to win procurement contracts (Interview 2). 

To conclude, it is interesting to note that although the transnational regulatory network for the modernization of the public procurement directives has been informal, the European Commission has provided a forum for the interaction of its members.  A Green Paper on expanding the use of e-procurement in the EU was published in 2010 and launched the debate (European Commission, 2010 and Interview 5).  A public consultation on the issue was initiated in January of 2011 and a large conference with the participation of government’s representatives, businesses, MEPs and other interested stakeholders took place in June of 2011 in Brussels (DG Growth, accessed 10/2/15). Indeed, most of the interviewees in our sample confirmed that there was plenty of opportunity for discussion and networking in light of the revision of the procurement directives (e.g. Interviews 1, 3, 4, 5, 7)

The new GPA and the EU: what type of a transnational regulatory network? 

In the section below we seek to go further in that we engage with the principal issues underpinning the role of the EU in the WTO. Does the Commission indeed lead EU negotiations in the WTO/GPA, and how does this work in practice? What can we learn from the role of the European Commission during the negotiations for the revision of the GPA? To what extent does EU legislation shape norms and attitudes at the WTO affecting the GPA, and is the reverse also true? Finally, does the EU seek to export its policy agenda, including its policy-making practices, to the WTO and in what way?

To start with, the Commission is indeed able to act as the EU’s single voice in WTO negotiations, including the GPA. While all member states take part in the relevant WTO Committee, it is the Commission which represents the Union as a whole and member states do not take the floor, despite the fact that they have the formal right to do so under WTO rules (Interview 12 ; Interview 4). The issue of Commission-member state competences and membership in the WTO has a long history. In fact, disagreements between the member states and the Commission as to the exact competences of each meant that the Commission brought the issue to the European Court of Justice (ECJ) back in 1994. The Court’s verdict was mixed, in that the EU obtained exclusive competence on cross-border services and trade in goods, whereas this was not the case for other modes of trade in services and trade-related intellectuaIl property rights (Debaere et al., 2014). The WTO charter was thus signed as a ‘mixed competences’ agreement, resulting in the fact that both the EU and member states partake in the organisation. 

In practice, the Commission’s supremacy over member states is manifested in the Committee’s seating order, whereby the Commission representatives sit in the front row and member states behind them (ibid.). An important proviso here is that the Commission interacts constantly with member-states, not least informally, and member states are kept up to date regarding the Commission’s negotiating tactics and intentions (Interview 7). Nonetheless, the internal division of labour within the Commission is not totally trouble-free (Interview 3): the Directorate Generals for Market and Trade have separate mandates and ‘different working cultures’ (Interview 11). While DG Markt is responsible for the GPA negotiations, it is DG Trade that looks at international trade negotiations and as the two issues intersect coordination issues can arise (ibid.). A certain asymmetry between the two Directorate Generals relates to their consultation exercises and stakeholder involvement. DG Trade is known to use such consultations very extensively, and tends to involve civil society groups, NGOs and trade unions as well as private interest groups (Crespy, 2014: 105). Yet this wide consultation does not conceal the fact that DG Trade echoes the views of business more than other groups, and that interest representation is unequal (Kohler-Koch and Finke 2007).(ibid.). 

When it comes to EU legislation and WTO agreements on procurement, our data reveals a cyclical relationship between the two institutions with mutual loopback effects. To begin with, the ‘old’ GPA was itself based on key EU concepts surrounding the appropriate design and execution of procurement contracts since the EU has one of the most developed public procurement regulatory frameworks in the world (Interview 3). This is far from coincidental: at a structural level, the EU has a clear advantage over the majority of other WTO members resulting from the bloc’s long experience in handling trade negotiations and pursuing a strategy of multilateralism based on the non-discrimination principle. While this has been in operation domestically, the Union has made consistent efforts to promote it at global level through the WTO too (Interview 12). Yet the relationship is clearly not one way: the adoption of the GPA in 1994 provided the impetus for the Union’s new internal market procurement legislation, borrowing from concepts developed at WTO level (Interview 5).  To illustrate, the revision of EU internal procurement legislation launched following the 1996 Commission Green Paper took place in light of the then new GPA and the rules this included (Interview 5; European Commission 1996). 

When it comes to the revised GPA of 2014, the role of the EU becomes even more explicit, not least as a result of accumulated experience over the years and the EU’s own Directives dating back to 2004. The new GPA bears the imprint of the EU in important respects: the Right to Appeal clauses, the Judicial Review Mechanism, and e-procurement were all part of previous EU legislation (Interview 4). The EU has thus had a massive impact in setting the framework within which the revised GPA would be based; in fact, the new GPA is ‘very much in harmony’ with the EU Directives on public procurement (Interview 12). In some cases, the EU utilized the GPA agreement in verbatim when reaching agreements with third parties, such as the EU-Azerbaijan Association Agreement (ibid.). 

But the EU influence gets more important when one considers the newly adopted Works Programs of the GPA: these were included at the behest of the EU and following the Union’s successful negotiation with other delegations (Interview 4; Interview 12). EU insistence on having these introduced reflects its own priorities on this policy area: the Works Programmes related to sustainable procurement, SMEs in procurement and safety standards (WTO Committee on Government Procurement, 2012, Annex 7). Moreover, the EU has not only been able to play an agenda-setting role with regard to the adoption of the Works Programmes; it is also attempting to export a particular policy-making mode to the WTO and in particular the policy learning/soft coordination approach. To illustrate, the Works Programmes are ongoing but a senior policy expert involved in the process argues that, given the nature of WTO negotiations and the EU attitude to the Programmes as of now, it is ‘highly likely’ that a sort of ‘best practice’ approach regarding the Programmes will be adopted, and parties will be encouraged to follow best examples of how these types of procurement are conducted across the GPA membership. This bears a striking resemblance to the EU’s Open Method of Coordination (OMC) approach, which was first introduced in the late 1990s in the area of employment and then expanded to more policy fields. 

Nevertheless, the adoption of the GPA was not merely the result of intense EU efforts to gain ground regarding its own approach to procurement at global level: it also helped legitimize the approach of key EU actors in revising the Directives of 2014, and added the pressure on reluctant actors often in the European Parliament to go ahead with the revision of EU public procurement legislation (Interview 1). Concretely, the new thresholds on procurement that the GPA entails narrowed the room for manoeuvre in the public procurement reform process at EU level by limiting some of the options for reform that some actors wanted to introduce (Interview 5). They also enabled an approach whereby the focus shifted on other public procurement aspects that could be open to negotiations between the parties (Interview 7). An example of that is the inauguration of the Innovation Partnerships Procedure (IPP).  

All in all then, it is fair to say that ‘without the EU there would have been no new GPA’ (Interview 12), and that the EU has been very successful in promoting its public procurement agenda to the WTO through the GPA (Interview 11), making use of Commission resources, technical expertise and its long-standing experience on the issue. Finally, and in line with the Commission’s record on trade negotiations overall, the Commission has not been particularly transparent in dealing with stakeholders regarding the GPA negotiations, and that includes the EP (Interview 10). 






This paper focused on the relations between the EU and the WTO in a relatively under researched policy area, namely public procurement. As the salience of this policy area, particularly in the context of a squeezed fiscal situation in Europe places a premium on sound procurement practices, its political significance is on the rise as well. Further, it is suggestive of the ability of the Union to speak with one voice and the role that its institutions play in the coordination process, not least because of the Union’s prior experience in coordination matters on this policy area. 

Adopting a transnational regulatory network approach as this study’s theoretical underpinning, we identified a series of valuable empirical results; some of those come to confirm widely held assumptions identified in the literature, while others highlight the need to subject the EU-WTO relationship to more detailed scrutiny.

To start with, our study does confirm the protagonist role of the Commission (and the relevant DGs in particular) in coordinating member states’ stance in WTO negotiations and in the context of the GPA in particular. Yet we also identify that the policy-making mechanisms of the Union and the consolidation of a stronger role afforded to the European Parliament after the Lisbon Treaty’s entry into force has multiplied the scene of relevant stakeholders in bringing about procurement-related policy results. This is strongly manifested in the latest EU Procurement Directives, which resulted from political activism by MEPs, local authorities and private enterprises. This network-like type of arrangement stems from the stakeholder culture embedded in the consultation process practiced by DG Trade in particular.

Further, and when analysing the Directives in juxtaposition to the GPA, we identify a cyclical relationship based on mutual loopback effects. The original 1994 GPA Agreement became a blueprint for EU legislation on procurement in the early 2000s. Moreover, and while the EU has been able to exert important influence on the latest GPA negotiations, to the extent that some of its working methods (i.e. peer-based policy learning) have made it into the Annex of the latest Revision, the Union has also been constrained by the GPA in reforming its Directives. In fact, these constraints have been utilized by policy entrepreneurs to achieve results in the revised Directives corresponding to their own preferences, especially with regard to social and environmental considerations. 
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